Occasional Tales

“Well, just eat the chips.” This whole debate boring me somewhat, I’ll finish it off today. Plutarch returns in Dilemma 66 with an emotive appeal about blood and gore. More ancient superstition rather than reality. And if the superstition of the classical world isn’t enough, St Paul turns up assuring everyone that it’s all right to eat meat ’cos the god of the Christians says it’s all right. The Bible is its usual inconsistent self and even seems to be advocating eating things alive (Genesis 1:29). Also, it’s easy to forget that plants are living things, which means that almost nothing natural we eat isn’t already dead. Chrysostom turns up to irritate everyone with his Christian asceticism, which pretty much makes all good things bad. Pope Pius XII isn’t impressed, although his view appears to be that animals don’t have (emotional) feelings, quite ignoring that they still have a nervous system. I remain on the side of nature. Humans as omnivorous creatures have a choice, although the a

Here come the Nazis. The star of today’s dilemma is Oswald Spengler who was, apparently, some Nazi philosopher following in the footsteps of Friedrich Nietzsche. Anyway, unlike Plutarch, he thinks that humans are predators, his ideas appearing to stem from Nietzsche’s idea of the Übermensch. Like Plutarch, this clown boy is only seeing half the picture. Like vegetarians faced with a famine, Spengler’s predator would graze on grass and leaves when faced with a shortage of prey. Or perhaps, taking Spengler’s notions to their logical extreme, cannibalism then becomes acceptable. “Let’s go vegetarian,” said Göring looking hungrily at Hitler. Interestingly, the book says that the amount of resources required to produce meat in the States is so phenomenal that the bulk of agricultural produce goes towards feeding the animals which the Americans then eat. And that bulk could, allegedly, feed the human population of the planet five times over. (Presumably one adequate, nourishing, hunger-assua

How chewy and delicious. Someone, Plutarch apparently, observed that humans are not the usual design for predators having none of the sharp claws and teeth for hunting. He noted that we then cook the (dead) meat and season it in various ways. So should meat-eaters be allowed into philosophy heaven? I’ll remind you of the chimpanzees which hunted down some other monkey and tore it apart for food. Chimpanzees, being similar in configuration to humans, are obviously hunters by nature, but like humans, omnivorous. (Strictly speaking, common chimpanzees are omnivorous; bonobos frugivorous; if I’m going to talk about chimpanzees, I’ll mean the common sort.) In other words, Plutarch is noting physical differences without considering behavioural ones. As a species we both hunt and gather; we eat both meat and vegetables. It gives us options which other species lack especially when food might be scarce. I’d defy a starving human (perhaps apart from a few extreme religious nutjobs) to remain veg

The regret of old age. Our tale of Democratia comes full circle today. The government database proves to be very costly, which resulted in businesses being roped in, being allowed access to the information for the benefit of the consumer. Really. The press started using the information to reveal the peccadillos of celebs and even the peccadillos of the idiot in the street. Reality TV never had it so good. But one or two ministers recalling youthful follies began to wonder whether individuals might need privacy after all. I notice that the politicians only talk about privacy when the issue affects them. I’d guess that Kant would take a fairly low view of their decision, which, though it benefits the public, is really being done on their own behalf. Of course, privacy seems to depend on the society itself. In China, a lot of life is conducted in public and may end up being everyone’s business. For the Chinese, a lot of life is street theatre which members of the public perform for the en

Thinking of how we can control them. Now for our third story about the noble, data-obsessed nation of Democratia and back to an issue I’ve mentioned before. The government manages to reduce the crime rate, but then decides that prevention is better than cure by banging up recidivists before they can get up to any mischief. And then recidivists came to include anyone who might complain a little and school children, who were an easy target. The choice was between the good of the many and the inconveniencing of a few. But did the government really have to think of the children? We seem to be back in the world of utilitarianism again. Indeed, this would just about be HMG’s ideal world in which the sheep-like populace thinking that it enjoys greater freedom than all those wretched foreign Johnnies fails to observe that its lot isn’t as good as it thought. In fact, all too many of the sheep-like populace would probably applaud. The scenario is not unlike Brave New World with its manufacture

And the government isn’t snooping at all. The government of Democratia passes the Data Protection Act which allows people to see what info the government has on them provided it’s not an official secret and the police don’t mind. And like any good government, it decides to collate lots and lots of information about the people in a database; and not just some girlie database – a super database. And it’s all so the government can help people. Really. (Yeah, I feel the belief coursing through my veins.) But then people start demanding access to all sorts of information, including information about politicians in local government and ministerial holidays. But should people be checking up on all this? Should the inspector be inspected? Well, yes. HMG likes to bleat about accountability, but they think that only applies to them when there’s an election. In this sort of scenario, all the activities of and information about the government would probably be labelled state secrets, sorry, a mat

Somebody’s watching me! Ah, the noble nation of Democratia. All cameras and hi-tech surveillance, but for the public good, of course, because everyone needs to be watched in case one of the country’s twenty-five criminals commits a crime. The question is whether the government has ridden rough shod over the right to privacy or whether all this intrusion is necessary. Like China, the UK is an endemic surveillance state. Like China, one government isn’t really that different from its predecessors in its paranoia about what its citizens are doing. It’s no good saying that if you’ve done nothing wrong, you don’t have anything to worry about. The implicit assumption is that the government doesn’t trust you regardless of what you’re doing. The implication is that you have no right to privacy where the government is concerned. I tend to think that such situations don’t instil feelings of safety in society and confidence in the government, but rather they produce suspicion and paranoia. Just l

And how we can use them as bargaining chips. A terrorist is threatening to detonate a bomb, but his identity is discerned, and it’s found that he has two children. President Settee threatens to imprison and interrogate them, but the terrorist tells him to do his worst. Nonetheless, a voice analysis reveals that the man is worried about his children. The president’s advisers think that if they harmed the children, the terrorist would compromise. Why not send him a video making it seem that one of the children is being beheaded? Why not send him a video of it actually happening? President Settee doesn’t find this idea to his liking, but the advisers notes that the children of terrorists go on to become terrorists themselves. If people could go back in time and stop dictators like Hitler, Stalin and Mao, surely they would? Prevention is better than cure, isn’t it? This is like Minority Report or various episodes of ST: Voyager when the Federation of the 29th century went nicking people

They’ll leave you gasping. A bargirl called Sam overhears a customer revealing to others that because he has HIV, he’s going to spread it about a bit. She knows that he’s allergic to peanuts and likes the free snacks. Sam thinks that if she puts some snacks into a dish which has been previously used for peanuts, the man might suffer an allergic reaction and thus be prevented from going through with his diabolical plan. It might be rough justice, but surely it would be justice. Is Sam doing the right thing? I could go round apprehending criminals, which would seem to benefit society, but I’m not a policeman and would be arrested for impersonating one. Although my intentions might be good, chaos would result if people went round arresting each other because sooner rather than later the entire process would shift from arresting people because they’ve done something criminal to arresting them because they might do something criminal. The justice system would collapse under the weight of p

Timmy swallowed nervously. Dilemma 57. A plane crash in the Himalayas. Three survivors, one of whom is badly injured and unlikely to survive. The other two, including the pilot, need to get going because their chance of rescue is slim. But they need provisions and Dominoes Pizza doesn’t deliver to the Himalayas. The young man suggests that Timmy should be the dish of the day. He’s doomed anyway. The pilot doesn’t fancy Timmy au vin , but the young man tells him a true story about some shipwrecked holidaymakers who abandoned a disabled man in order to survive. “Oh I remember that. It was the first or second dilemma in the book,” said the pilot. “Captain Flintheart, wasn’t it? Why didn’t they throw him overboard?” This dilemma is rather like the first one or two about sacrificing a few so that the rest may survive or condemning all. In this scenario, however, it’s the choice between letting Timmy die slowly while the cold weakens the other two, or killing Timmy and cooking him, thus enab

Pleasure or denial? Today’s dilemma is about Siddhartha Gautama, in Indian prince who found himself among the serfs one day and was deeply moved by their dire circumstances. He adopted an ascetic life, which merely made him sick, although, fortunately, his friends nursed him back to health. When he thought about it, asceticism was merely another form of self-indulgence. Which way now to the good life? I think what constitutes the good life differs from person to person according to their circumstances and that for most of us, it’s an ideal because there are always aspects of our lives which fall short of good. For example, I don’t consider teaching stupid, lazy school children in China to be part of the good life. I’m wary of anyone who might try to tell me how I should live to achieve the good life, although I might consider some ideas because they might benefit me, but dismiss others that are injurious. I don’t find a life of mindless indolence to be appealing even if I like the indo

And the long preamble. Today’s dilemma is about beauty and how it’s perceived. It’s the story of Birdy vs. her hot, popular, brilliant younger sister, Wolfie. Eventually, Wolfie starts taking steps to uglify herself (not altogether successful) while Birdy goes on a diet. It’s not hard to see where this is going. It’s the old fertility-signals business. In other words, whether we try to abstract such matters or not and claim that appearance doesn’t matter, we’re like every other creature in the animal kingdom: there are certain visual cues which we look for and may exhibit. There’s more to the matter than this, but we have exams this week and I don’t feel like discussing this at length. Tomorrow, The Good Life. Buddha makes an appearance, so does asceticism. Party on.

It's my cash and I’ll burn it if I want to. Today’s dilemma, delayed by the tedium of exams, is about Justin Megabucks, who has so much money from his recording career that for want of anything else to do with it, he burns it for fun sometimes. He’s been criticised for his extravagance, but says that people are envious and that he’s under no obligation to help others. Is he right? Well, he is. Whether I have £1 or £1,000, the money’s mine to do with as I please even although the way in which I use it may not be considered to be maximally beneficial to others and, indeed, utterly wasteful if it doesn’t benefit anyone. In the view of other people, giving the money to someone seems to be better than burning it, although I could stand the whole matter on its head by giving the money to someone who doesn’t need it. Just giving the money to any random recipient wouldn’t necessarily stop people from complaining. In other words, the right thing is to use the money to help others. It’s ano

Thomas did it. Thomas has graduated from virtue yesterday to vice today, having been caught stealing sweets from a jar on the teacher’s desk. These are meant to be a reward for pupils who have done good work.[ 1 ] Mr Bollard wonders what’d happen if everyone helped themselves. Thomas argues (clumsily) that if anyone is hungry, tired and normally responsible, and [because] there are lots of sweeties, then it’d be all right for everyone to help themselves. Mr Bollard is about to clout the little bugger with a blackboard duster, but wonders whether he has a point. Mrs Cook the dinner lady says that what Thomas did was wrong because the sweet didn’t belong to him and he was naughty because he stole it. But Thomas is undaunted and enlists Anarchists. He wants to know why his action was wrong, not just to be told it was wrong. Mr Bollard is a bit dim, methinks, unless he understands something about Thomas’s original argument that I don’t. For a start, sweets don’t satisfy anyone’s hunger, al

Meno’s idea of them is rubbish according to Socrates Thomas. Today’s dilemma, the fifty-second, takes us off in a different direction to consider the nature of virtue. The preamble is about Thomas who, being the victim of sundry misfortunes, wonders why he should do what is right when the world treats him so unfairly. His teacher, Mrs Heffalump, directs Thomas to Plato’s Meno in which Socrates asks Meno to define virtue. Thomas, who appears to be cast in the role of Socrates, dismisses Meno’s definition as nonsense. In the dialogue, Meno starts by asking Can you tell me, Socrates, whether virtue is acquired by teaching or by practice; or if neither by teaching nor practice, then whether it comes to man by nature, or in what other way? Socrates asks him to define virtue, but his definition concentrates on the individual when Socrates is looking for something more general, a feature which is common to them. Meno’s other attempts to define virtue are no more successful. In the end, virt

Finding in favour of the plaintiff. In Dilemma 51, we not only pass the halfway mark, but also continue yesterday’s tale of Albert, who wins his case. The lab rats, sorry, scientists appeal by noting that Albert has no responsibilities and, therefore, no rights. But obviously there are also plenty of humans who have no responsibilities and would, according to this claim, have no rights. It would seem incredible that such people would be treated like Samuel, but that’s exactly what happened in Nazi Germany. The appeal fails and the lab appeal again. In court, the counsel for the lab has a pig brought out, saying that although pigs are thought to be intelligent, no one would grant them rights. And to underline the point, the pig craps on the floor. The counsel notes that chimpanzees play no part in human society, hence the same rights cannot be meaningfully extended to them. At this, Albert gets up and goes and puts an arm around his trainer, Felicity. My first thought is that humans int

But then again, philosophers don’t tend to be zoologists. Today’s dilemma takes us into the world of higher primates. Two chimpanzees are taught to communicate with each other and do so at a basic level. One day, Samuel disappears because he’s being used in an experiment which involves dicing up his brain. (Gordon Ramsey’s Chimp Chow Special!) Albert goes on hunger strike, and their trainer, Felicity, take the whole matter to court. Albert uses sign language to present his case, but the defence counsel argues that It’s inappropriate to ascribe human emotions and understanding to animals. The use of Samuel in some experiment benefits people. Albert, a chimpanzee, is asking for human rights, which would mean that animals would have rights over and above humans. I’d agree with the defence counsel. The evidence is against Albert because chimps don’t communicate in the same way humans do unless humans have taught them. It appears they have the potential for sophisticated communication, but

Diues et Lazarus. Lazarus the Begger sits outside a rich man’s gate hoping for a few alms, but even although the dogs lick the beggar’s sores, the rich man doesn’t spare Lazarus a shekel. The rich man dies and finds himself the Hell. He sees Lazarus with Abraham and asks the latter to send the former with a drop of water on the tip of his finger to cool his tongue. But Abraham reminds the rich man that he knew the good things in life while Lazarus only knew the bad and now they’re getting their just desserts. Such a punishment seems fitting, but just as the rich man is being tormented for his treatment of Lazarus, will Abraham be punished for his treatment of the rich man? Speaking of beggars, they were out in force in town today, but I wasn’t about to dispense any largesse to them. I work on the principle of fair distribution. If I give to one, why am I not giving to all? None of them seem to have any greater merit than any of the others. I have no control over how these people use th