Virtues
Meno’s idea of them is rubbish according to Socrates Thomas.
Today’s dilemma, the fifty-second, takes us off in a different direction to consider the nature of virtue. The preamble is about Thomas who, being the victim of sundry misfortunes, wonders why he should do what is right when the world treats him so unfairly. His teacher, Mrs Heffalump, directs Thomas to Plato’s Meno in which Socrates asks Meno to define virtue. Thomas, who appears to be cast in the role of Socrates, dismisses Meno’s definition as nonsense.
In the dialogue, Meno starts by asking
In the dialogue, Meno starts by asking
Can you tell me, Socrates, whether virtue is acquired by teaching or by practice; or if neither by teaching nor practice, then whether it comes to man by nature, or in what other way?
Socrates asks him to define virtue, but his definition concentrates on the individual when Socrates is looking for something more general, a feature which is common to them. Meno’s other attempts to define virtue are no more successful. In the end, virtue is never defined.
Virtues, it seems to me, are like morals in that what is considered virtuous depends on the society in which they’re found (and by individuals themselves).[1] What the Greeks of Socrates’ day regarded as virtuous wouldn’t necessarily be regarded in the same way today, and Meno’s original examples show no understanding that the set of virtues may change through time and space. In certain societies, religious belief is no longer regarded as a virtue, and in the current economic climate, frugality is making a comeback, not that extravagance was a virtue to begin with, but perhaps this illustrates a point about virtues: circumstance would appear to determine their desirability.
Another problem with virtues is where they end and vice begins. For example, I regard moderation as a virtue, but don’t ask me to say where parsimony ends and moderation begins or moderation ends and excess begins, partly because the circumstances may determine where I judge things to be too much or too little. But that’s a personal matter and if I want to be contrary, that’s also my business.[2]
If I had to reply to Meno’s original question, I think I’d say that virtue is much like language. We all have our own grammars which coincide by and large but differ on many points. We don’t acquire our native language consciously just as we don’t acquire the customs and mores of our society consciously. Like much else, virtues are not innate.
Notes
1. To be a little more exact, there are public virtues which, like morals, are the ones on which there are general agreement throughout a society; there are group virtues which are shared by those of a particular outlook; and there are individual virtues which we define according to out own views. Like language, there’s probably a certain amount of code switching because the virtues of each of these three areas only generally coincide, but differ in their specifics.
2. One thing that’s struck me about philosophy is that the rigid application of a school of thought (e.g. the Stoics or Epicureans) to a person’s life results in an unnatural life. It seems that it’s normal for humans to be contrary, but it’s a trait which can be subject to criticism. Excessive contrariness is not a good thing, but nor is a rigid approach to life. To die for a belief seems indulgent and I’m quite happy to be a hypocrite and agree with others if it benefits me in some way. (Mind you, I’m also likely to regard the other person as a fool, but prefer not to waste time contradicting them.)
Virtues, it seems to me, are like morals in that what is considered virtuous depends on the society in which they’re found (and by individuals themselves).[1] What the Greeks of Socrates’ day regarded as virtuous wouldn’t necessarily be regarded in the same way today, and Meno’s original examples show no understanding that the set of virtues may change through time and space. In certain societies, religious belief is no longer regarded as a virtue, and in the current economic climate, frugality is making a comeback, not that extravagance was a virtue to begin with, but perhaps this illustrates a point about virtues: circumstance would appear to determine their desirability.
Another problem with virtues is where they end and vice begins. For example, I regard moderation as a virtue, but don’t ask me to say where parsimony ends and moderation begins or moderation ends and excess begins, partly because the circumstances may determine where I judge things to be too much or too little. But that’s a personal matter and if I want to be contrary, that’s also my business.[2]
If I had to reply to Meno’s original question, I think I’d say that virtue is much like language. We all have our own grammars which coincide by and large but differ on many points. We don’t acquire our native language consciously just as we don’t acquire the customs and mores of our society consciously. Like much else, virtues are not innate.
Tomorrow’s dilemma seems to take us into the world of victimless crime. Am I right? Am I wrong? You’ll just have to be patient.
Notes
1. To be a little more exact, there are public virtues which, like morals, are the ones on which there are general agreement throughout a society; there are group virtues which are shared by those of a particular outlook; and there are individual virtues which we define according to out own views. Like language, there’s probably a certain amount of code switching because the virtues of each of these three areas only generally coincide, but differ in their specifics.
2. One thing that’s struck me about philosophy is that the rigid application of a school of thought (e.g. the Stoics or Epicureans) to a person’s life results in an unnatural life. It seems that it’s normal for humans to be contrary, but it’s a trait which can be subject to criticism. Excessive contrariness is not a good thing, but nor is a rigid approach to life. To die for a belief seems indulgent and I’m quite happy to be a hypocrite and agree with others if it benefits me in some way. (Mind you, I’m also likely to regard the other person as a fool, but prefer not to waste time contradicting them.)
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