And now for the forecast
With the lovely Cassandra.
Cassandra is forecasting great losses for the Greeks if the sea battle (ναυμαχία, as they say in Greek) goes ahead. But since the enemy had already sent the Greeks an invitation to which they’d RSVPed, the admiral thought it would be rather rude of them not to attend. [Paraphrasing scenarios is one thing, but you're just making this up. –ed.]
Unfortunately for the Greeks, Cassandra’s forecast was accurate, and when the accuracy of subsequent prophecies became known, the Greeks took to consulting her before any military engagements.
But the admiral wasn’t so pleased and got a couple of sophists and a couple of philosophers to undermine Cassandra’s credibility. As Euthydemus proved, sophists were idiots, but the philosophers had an idea.
They suggested that because the future hasn’t happened, Cassandra’s forecasts must be false. Also, if the admiral had conducted the battle a little differently, the outcome would’ve been different, thus invalidating the prediction. In a modified statement, the philosophers declare that Cassandra’s forecasts are neither true nor false, but, instead, undetermined by undetermined events.
Cassandra is a little pissed off because her forecasts are of events that’ll actually happen and, therefore, true. She counters that statements about the past and present might be exactly the same, being neither true nor false but pending confirmation.
So who can the people believe?
I was thinking back to the recent scenarios about time and realised in a slightly perverse way we can see the future. If someone throws a ball to you, you know that in the very near future you’re going to catch it. As you watch the ball, you can see the future coming. Of course, this is different from prediction of a more remote future. I can only see the future (even although, paradoxically, it’s coming in from the past) as far as my perception allows me to see anything. Only things coming towards me are in my future; those that are going away move further into the past; those which travel on a parallel course at the same speed remain unchanged.
According to the discussion in the back of the book, this scenario gets into issues of free will. If Cassandra’s predictions are correct, there’s nothing anyone can do about them and, therefore, no free will. It’s possible, of course, not to have any choice in our decisions either because we’re externally or internally constrained. External constraint is when someone tells you to do something; internal constraint is selecting the choice which seems best to you, but may not be the most optimal choice. Free will (of a sort) is where there are (several) choices and all seem reasonable. I doubt whether this happens often.
I’m inclined to agree with the philosophers that Cassandra’s statements are undetermined, although that might only apply to people who aren’t clairvoyant. What, for instance, would the situation be if Cassandra had told the admiral what to do to avoid defeat? Is her prediction evidence that he ignores her? On the other hand, if he takes her advice and the Greeks win the battle, what did Cassandra actually see? That can’t be the future. In other words, even if Cassandra did tell the admiral how to avoid defeat, he’s going to be defeated anyway because he ignored her. But that’s his choice, isn’t it?
If, on the other hand, Cassandra sees a victory, that means that the admiral did do whatever thing was necessary to win the battle. But that’s still the future and not some alternative to a future in which the fleet was defeated because the admiral did the wrong thing.
The situation is a little like language change which often appears teleological when it isn’t. The admiral could take Cassandra’s advice or ignore it. He may ignore it, but the future isn’t making him do that because it has no conscious aims. He could do something which might’ve won the battle but happens to fail.
Unfortunately for the Greeks, Cassandra’s forecast was accurate, and when the accuracy of subsequent prophecies became known, the Greeks took to consulting her before any military engagements.
But the admiral wasn’t so pleased and got a couple of sophists and a couple of philosophers to undermine Cassandra’s credibility. As Euthydemus proved, sophists were idiots, but the philosophers had an idea.
They suggested that because the future hasn’t happened, Cassandra’s forecasts must be false. Also, if the admiral had conducted the battle a little differently, the outcome would’ve been different, thus invalidating the prediction. In a modified statement, the philosophers declare that Cassandra’s forecasts are neither true nor false, but, instead, undetermined by undetermined events.
Cassandra is a little pissed off because her forecasts are of events that’ll actually happen and, therefore, true. She counters that statements about the past and present might be exactly the same, being neither true nor false but pending confirmation.
So who can the people believe?
I was thinking back to the recent scenarios about time and realised in a slightly perverse way we can see the future. If someone throws a ball to you, you know that in the very near future you’re going to catch it. As you watch the ball, you can see the future coming. Of course, this is different from prediction of a more remote future. I can only see the future (even although, paradoxically, it’s coming in from the past) as far as my perception allows me to see anything. Only things coming towards me are in my future; those that are going away move further into the past; those which travel on a parallel course at the same speed remain unchanged.
According to the discussion in the back of the book, this scenario gets into issues of free will. If Cassandra’s predictions are correct, there’s nothing anyone can do about them and, therefore, no free will. It’s possible, of course, not to have any choice in our decisions either because we’re externally or internally constrained. External constraint is when someone tells you to do something; internal constraint is selecting the choice which seems best to you, but may not be the most optimal choice. Free will (of a sort) is where there are (several) choices and all seem reasonable. I doubt whether this happens often.
I’m inclined to agree with the philosophers that Cassandra’s statements are undetermined, although that might only apply to people who aren’t clairvoyant. What, for instance, would the situation be if Cassandra had told the admiral what to do to avoid defeat? Is her prediction evidence that he ignores her? On the other hand, if he takes her advice and the Greeks win the battle, what did Cassandra actually see? That can’t be the future. In other words, even if Cassandra did tell the admiral how to avoid defeat, he’s going to be defeated anyway because he ignored her. But that’s his choice, isn’t it?
If, on the other hand, Cassandra sees a victory, that means that the admiral did do whatever thing was necessary to win the battle. But that’s still the future and not some alternative to a future in which the fleet was defeated because the admiral did the wrong thing.
The situation is a little like language change which often appears teleological when it isn’t. The admiral could take Cassandra’s advice or ignore it. He may ignore it, but the future isn’t making him do that because it has no conscious aims. He could do something which might’ve won the battle but happens to fail.
They’re sophisticated but they’re not clever: computers. Tomorrow’s scenario will be served with beer and sandwiches. (NB Patrons must bring their own beer. And sandwiches.)
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